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STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
[44 C.2d 1; 279 P.2d 24) 
[ Crim. ~o. 5591. In Bank. F'eb. 1, 1955.] 
In re CAHYL CHESSMAN, on Habeas Corpus. 
[ S. I~. No. 19158. In Bank. ]i'eb. 1, 1955.] 
nm PEOPI.JE, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT OF 
MAHIN COUN'rY, Respondent; CARYL CHESSMAN, 
Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Habeas Corpus- Function of Writ.-]'unction of writ of 
habeas corpus is solely to el1cct "discharge" from unlawful 
restraint, though illegality in respect to which discharge from 
restraint is sought may not go to fact of continued detention 
hut may be simply as to circumstances under which prisoner 
is held, as, for example, where he questions propriety of his 
detention as habitual criminal or where he questions construc-
tion of judgment of conYiction under which he is held. 
[2] !d.-Hearing-Scope of Inquiry.-Scope of inquiry at hearing 
on writ of habeas corpus includes consideration of any fact to 
show either that petitioner's imprisonment or detention is un-
lawful or that he is entitled to his discharge. (Pen. Code, 
§ 1484.) 
[1] Sec Cal.Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 2; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus, 
§ 2. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 2; [2, 9] Habeas 
Corpus, § 59; [3] Habeas Corpus, § 65; [ 4] Habeas Corpus, § 73; 
Habeas Corpus,§ 74; [6-8, 10, 11] Habeas Corpus, § 38. 





Id.-Appeal-By Whom Taken.-~·The may maintain an 
from order in habeas corpus that prisoner 
"tontinue to he nllowed tltt' freu ext'rtise" of nsserted 
m with his of although 
offieiuls are named as rl'spondents 
for such is found in 
which provides that may be taken 
certain orders on corpus. 
[5] !d.-Certiorari-Availability of Writ.-Writ of certiorari will 
not lie to review habeas corpus order of superior court where 
remedy of appeal is available. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1068.) 
[6] !d.-Privileges of Person Rightfully in Custody.-Writ of 
habeas corpus may he allowed to one lawfully in custody as 
means of enforcing rights to which, in his confinement, he is 
entitled, such as right to file in court a petition or other docu-
ment which purports to seek some remedy or relief relating to 
offense for which he is imprisoned, and right, at reasonable 
times, to consult with his counsel in preparation for 
trial. 
[7] !d.-Privileges of Persons Rightfully in Custody.-Prisoner 
was not deprived of to access of courts and to consult 
counsel so as to entitle him to relief by habeas corpus where, 
aside from fact that warden temporarily took erroneous posi-
tion that he could refuse to permit filing of petition for habeas 
corpus, no violation of any right to which prisoner is entitled 
was made to appear, where prisoner's temporary separation 
from his papers was shown to have been an incident of his 
punishment for violation of reasonable prison rule against 
ereation of loud disturbances, and where refusal to permit 
him to see counsel was shown to have been based on reasonable 
ground that such counsel was not his attorney. 
[8] !d.-Privileges of Persons Rightfully in Custody.-Prisoner's 
decision to represent himself in judicial proceeding does not 
entitle him to greater privilPges than other prisoners. 
[9] Id.-Hearing-Dismissal.-vYhere it appears at hearings on 
prisoner's petition for habeas corpus that he is not then being 
deprived of rights to which he is entitled, superior court 
should grant the People's motion to dismiss. 
f 6] See Cal.Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 6; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus, 
~ 113. 
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!d.-Privileges of Persons Rightfully in Custody.--Allowing 
"immediate access by mail to the courts ... at all 
" is not an enforceable right. 
!d.-Privileges of Persons Rightfully in Custody.-Prisoners 
have right to prompt and timely access to mails for purpose 
of to courts statements of fact which attempt to 
for but have no enforce-
research. 
APPEAL from order made in habeas corpus proceeding 
of to access to courts 
and to consult and PHOCEEDING in certiorari to 
review and annul such order. Thomas F. Keating, Judge. 
Order reversed with directions; writ of certiorari discharged 
and review proceeding dismissed. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn, 
Assistant Attorney General, and Charles E. MeClung, Deputy 
Attorney General, for Appellant in Crim. No. 5591, and for 
Petitioner in S. F. No. 19158. 
Caryl Chessman, in pro. per., and Rosalie Asher for Re-
spondent on appeal in Crim. No. 5591 and for Real Party in 
Interest in S. F. No. 19158. 
No apprarance for respondent in S. F. No. 19158. 
SCHAUER, J.-By a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed on Oetober 17, 1951, Caryl Chessman, an inmate of San 
Quentin State Prison whose appeal from 17 judgments of 
conviction was pending, sought relief from allegedly illegal 
conditions of imprisonment which assertedly interfered with 
his representation of himsel£. 1 On December 18, 1951, this 
court affirmed the judgments, two of which imposed the death 
penalty. (People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166 [238 P.2d 
1001].) The subject matter of Chessman's petition for habeas 
corpns has no relevancy whatsoever to the proceedings at the 
trial which resulted in his eonviction or to the legality of the 
judgments which were imposed and affirmed and under which 
he is now confined and awaiting execution; it relates solely 
'Petitioner continued to represent himself in these proceedings until 
~ ovemher 8, 1954, when Mr. Berwyn Rice was appointed to represent 
him. On November 24, at Chessman's request, the appointment of 
Mr. Rice was terminaterl. At oral argument Miss Rosalie Asher 
appeared for Chessman. 
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to a matter of prison administration. After the judgments 
had been affirmed the superior in the habeas corpus 
proceeding, ordered that Chessman ''continue to be allowed 
the free exercise'' of asserted rights in connection with his 
representation of himself. The attorney general filed with 
the District Court of a notiee of appeal from the 
superior court order; also, uncertain whether the People could 
appeal from the order, the filed with the 
District Court of Appeal a petition for a writ of ndew. 'rhe 
District Court of Appeal issned the writ of review. The 
matters have been transferred to this court, and Chessman 
has filed notices of motion to dismiss the reYiew proceeding 
and the appeal. ~We have conelmlecl, for reasons hereinafter 
stated, that the order appealed from should be reversed with 
directions to the superior court to dismiss the habeas corpus 
proceeding, and that the review proceeding should be dis-
missed. 
AppealabiWy of the Habeas Corpus Order 
The principal ground of Chessman's motion to dismiss the 
appeal is that the superior court order is not appealable. 
The People have asked that this court pass on the question 
whether they can appeal from an order on habeas corpus 
which directs that a petitioner be granted relief but which 
does not order his release from enstody. 
In accord with the view that "The right of appeal is derived 
from our constitution or statutes" (Gale v. 'l'nolwnne County 
~Water· Co. (1914), 169 Cal. 46, ii2 [H5 P. 532] ), prior to the 
enactment of section 1506 of the Penal Code in 1927 it was 
held that no orders on habeas corpus were appealable. (lJ!Iaiter 
of Perkins (1852), 2 Cal. 424, 430; People v. Schuster (1871), 
40 Cal. 627; Matter of Hughes (1911), 159 Cal. 360,363 
[113 P. 684]; 1lfatto· of Zany (1913), ]64 Cal. 724, 727 [130 
P. 710]; F'mnce v. S11perior Court (1927), 201 Cal. 122, 127 
[255 P. 815, 52 A.L.R. 869]; Ex parte White (1906), 2 Cal. 
App. 726, 727 [84 P. 242].) Section 1506 of the Penal Code, 
as enacted in 1927, provided insofar as is here material that 
''An appeal may be taken ... by the people from a final 
order of a suprrior court ma(le upon the return of a writ of 
habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his conviction, 
in all criminal eases prosecuted by indictment or information 
in a court of reeO'"fl. ... " 'fhere followed a series of eases 
which announced that the People eould appeal only in those 
eases which came within the precise wording of the statute 
and refused to allow an appeal where the habeas corpus order 
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made after conviction in a criminal case prosecuted 
indictment or information. re Alpine (1928), 203 Cal. 
58 A.L.ll. 1500); ln 1·e Bruegger (1928), 
P. 101] ; Thuesen v. S~tperior Cotlrt 
), 210 Cal. 576 [12 P.2d 8); Lonstalot v. Superior 
) , 30 Ca1.2d 913 [186 P.2d 673] ; ln re Merwin 
, 108 31, 32 [290 P. 1076] ; ln re Dutton 
(1931), 119 Cal.App. 447, 448 [6 P.2d 558].) 
in the last cited eases the court would not allow 
the People where there was literal com-
requirements that there be "con vic-
" in a case "by indictment or information," 
Jiberal vieT\' as to the meaning of the word "discharging" 
section 1506 was taken in In re Larabee (1933), 131 Cal. 
261, 264 P.2d 132]. •rherc an imnate of San Quen-
confined pursuant to a judgment of conviction in Los 
County, sought habeas corpus in Marin County. 
the superior court order in the habeas corpus proceeding 
nnnTHHlOT' was ''remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of 
I.~os Angeles County.'' The People appealed. Petitioner moved 
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the order was not, 
in the language of section 1506 of the Penal Code, one 
"discharging" him. In denying the motion to dismiss, the 
appellate court said that the effect of the order was to dis-
charge the petitioner from the custody of the warden, and the 
fact that the superior court also ordered petitioner remanded 
to the custody of the sheriff ''did not have the effect of 
depriving the state of its right of appeal, for the reason that 
iu the face of a valid commitment the trial court was without 
po>Yer to make such order." 
In 1951 section 1506 of the Penal Code was amended to 
that "An appeal may be taken ... by the people 
from a final order of a superior court made upon the return 
of a writ of habeas corpus discharging a defendant after his 
conviction in all criminal cases. . . . '' It is Chessman's 
position that the order here is not appealable because it is not 
one "discharging" him. The People argue that as the uses 
of habeas corpus have been extended by judicial decision to 
the granting to prisoners of rights short of effecting their 
release from Hlegal custody, there should be a concomitant 
extension of appealability to orders effecting these new uses 
of the \\Tit. [1] The function of the writ of habeas corpus 
is solely to effect "discharge" from unlawful restraint, though 
tlw illrgalit.r in respect to which tlJC discharge from restraint 
go i o tJw far:t of but 
to the c:iremnstam~es which the 
1s the pro-
of his detention as an habitual criminal (In re Jlc-
Vickers (1946), 29 CaL2d 264 [ 176 P.2d ; In re Seeley 
( 1946), 29 Cal.2d 294, 299 [ 17 6 P .2d ; In re H arincar 
, 29 Cal.2d 403 In re ) , 
:30 Cal.2d 20 [180 P.2d In re Pearson (1947), ilO CaL2c1 
871 P.2d 401]) or where he questions the construction 
of the judgment of conviction under which he is held 
Br·arnble ( 194 7), 31 Cal.2d 51 tl87 P .2d 411] ) . " 
person unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, 
under any pretense may a writ of habeas 
corpus, to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or 
restraint." (Pen. Code, § 1473.) [2, 3] The scope of in-
quiry at the hearing on the writ includes consideration of 
''any fact to show either that his imprisonment or detention 
is unlawful, or that he is entitled to his discharge" (Pen. 
Code, § 1484) and "If no legal cause is shown for snch 
imprisonment or restraint, or for the continuation thereof, 
. . . [the] court or judge must discharge such party from 
the custody or restraint under which he is held" (Pen. Code, 
§ 1485), which means that the prisoner may be discharged 
from illegal conditions of restraint although not from all 
restraint. Since this is the function and scope of habeas 
corpus, we conclude that it is proper and desirable to interprrt 
section 1506 of the Penal Code in its use of the word ''dis-
charging" as being fully as broad as the scope of the writ 
itself. 
The People as Parties to the Appeal 
[4] It is Chessman's position that the appeal should be 
dismissed because the People are not parties vdw can maintain 
such appeal. The People are not named as respondents ill 
the petition for habeas corpus; the respondents there named 
are the warden, two assistant wardens, and the chief custody 
ofiicer of San Quentin. However, authority for an appeal in 
the name of the People is found in section 1506 of the Penal 
Code which since its enactment has provided that an appeal 
may be taken "by the people" from certain orders on habeas 
corpus. 
Availab1:lity of Certiorari to Review Superior 
Court Habeas Corpus Order 
[5] In support of his motion to dismiss the writ of cer-
tiorari Chessman contends that such writ will not lie to 
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an order of the superior court on habeas corpus, no 
matter how erroneous it may be, if the superior court had 
"jurisdiction," citing Matter Hughes ( 1911), supra, 159 
Cal. 360, 363. (See also Rose v. SupeTior Court (1948), 86 
173, 176 [194 P.2d 568].) However, we need not 
this time reexamine the rationale of the Hughes case, or 
consider the grounds of dismissal urged by Chess-
man, because it follows as a matter of law from our conclusion 
that the of is available, that the writ of cer-
tiorari will not lie Civ. Proc., § 1068), and, having 
been inadvertently issued, it will be discharged and the pro-
ceeding will be dismissed (see 1rlatter of Hughes (1911), 
supra, 159 Cal. 360, 366; Rose v. Super·ior Court (1948). 
supra, 86 Cal.A pp.2d 173, 178). 
The MeTits of the Superior Court Order 
The original petition for habeas corpus dated October 3, 
1951, alleges in pertinent part that Chessman has appeared 
and desires to continue to appear in his own behalf in his 
then pending appeal, and that he anticipates unjustifiable 
punishment, "depriving him of the use of books, typewriter, 
etc., on the pretext that he has violated a prison rule by 
helping another man prepare a legal document." A supple-
ment to the petition, dated October 7, 1951, alleges that the 
vYarden refused to have the original petition mailed to the 
superior court for filing; he returned it to Chessman with a 
notation that "I note that you anticipate that you are to 
receive some sort of punishment. I do not believe that any 
of us can look into the future and determine what will happen. 
I also note that you do not tell the truth throughout the peti-
tion." A further supplement, dated October 10, 1951, alleges 
that Chessman ''is now confined in a 'hole' cell,'' denied thr 
use of "clerical supplies or legal books," and "has only a 
few sheets of this paper and pen." The petition and the two 
supplements were filed on October 17, 1951. 
The writ issued and pnrsuant to its command Chessman 
was produced before the superior court; respondent warden 
filed a return and moved that the matter be dismissed. Chess-
men filed a traverse to the return in which he asked that the 
petition stand as partial traverse and averred that the prison 
authorities ''continue to treat petitioner in such a way ... 
as to deprive petitioner of his legal right effectively to litigate 
his case through the courts.'' 
Chessman, although under sentence of death, personally ap-
peared at six hearings in the superior court between October 
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and March 7, 1952. The following facts were estab-
lished: The delay in the filing of the original petition was 
clue to the fact that the warden sent it to the attorney general 
with a request for advice as to whether he should mail it to 
the court for filing; the attorney general advised that the 
warden should permit its filing. On October 9, 1951, the 
prison disciplinary committee found that Chessman had vio-
lated a prison rule by aiding another inmate and punished 
him by a reprimand; also on October 9, 1951, Chessman 
crrated a loud disturbance and for this he was summarily 
punished by confinement in a "quiet cell," without type-
writer, books, or his papers, from October 10 to 15, 1951. 
On October 16, 1951, the disciplinary committee found Chess-
man guilty of disorderly conduct and he was punished by 
confinement to his own cell for 10 days. On October 26, 
1951, Chessman first appeared in the superior court in the 
habeas corpus matter, the facilities which had been given him 
in connection with his representation of himself had been 
restored to him, and he admitted that the question of the 
deprivation of such facilities "in the abstract ... is moot." 
During the course of the hearings Chessman wrote to Mr. 
Garry, attorney of record for another prisoner, that he wished 
to see Mr. Garry; Mr. Garry called at the prison to talk with 
his client, then asked to see Chessman; an assistant warden 
informed Mr. Garry that he could not see Chessman because 
he was not attorney of record for him. Mr. Garry sat with 
Chessman at the counsel table as "legal advisor" during one 
of the hearings on the habeas corpus matter. 
The superior court ordered that the warden's motion to 
dismiss be denied and that Chessman "be remanded to the 
custody of the \Varden ... with directions that the said 
Petitioner continue to be allowed the free exercise of the 
following legal and constitutional rights: 
"(1) That the said Petitioner be allowed immediate access 
by mail to the courts of this State and of the United States 
at all times; 
"(2) That the said Petitioner be allowed to make all reason-
ably necessary legal research for, and to prepare and file with 
any such court, any document he deems necessary to the 
maintenance of protection of his civil rights or to the effective 
representation of himself on appeal from, or in collaterally 
attacking, any or all of those judgments of conviction under 
which the Respondent \Varden derives his legal authority to 
hold the said Petitioner in custody. 
1955] IN RE CHESSMAN 
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That the said Petitioner be allowed to retain his 
legal papers and books at all times during which 
he may reasonably make use of them for the purposes here-
inabove set forth. 
That while so representing himself on appeal or in 
collaterally attacking any or all of those said judgments of 
conviction, the said Petitioner should be allowed privately 
to consult with attorne.rs of his own choosing and to consult 
and communicate with other responsible persons, so long as 
the said Petitioner and those who confer with him at the 
or communicate with him upon legal matters comply 
with the Rules and Regulations of the Prison respecting such 
activities.'' 
[6] The writ of habeas corpus has been allowed to one 
lawfully in custody as a means of enforcing rights to which, 
in his confinement, he is entitled. It has been held that a 
prisoner is entitled to, and habeas corpus is available to 
enforce, "the right to file in any court a petition or other 
doeument which purports to seek some remedy or relief relat-
ing to the offense for which he was imprisoned" (In re Robin-
son (1952), 112 Cal.App.2d 626, 629 [246 P.2d 982]; In re 
lllalone (1952), 112 CaLApp.2d 631 [246 P.2d !)84]; see 
Ex parte Hull (1941), 312 U.S. 546, 549 [61 S.Ct. 640, 85 
fLEd. 1034]) and petitioner's right, at reasonable times, to 
consult privately ·with his counsel in preparation for trial 
re Ricler (1920), 50 CaLApp. 797, 799 [195 P. 965); 
In re Snyder (1923), 62 Cal.App. 697, 699 [217 P. 777]; 
In 1·e Qualls (1943), 58 Cal.App.2d 330, 331 [136 P.2d 341]). 
[7] The present order eannot be upheld as one enforcing 
such rights, for at the time of the hearings and the making 
of the order Chessman was not being deprived of those rights. 
The petition for habeas corpus had been filed and the delay 
preceding its filing was no longer a ground for complaint. 
Aside from the fact that the warden temporarily took the 
erroneous position that he could refuse to permit the filing 
of the petition for habeas corpus, no violation of any right 
to which a prisoner is entitled was made to appear. The 
temporary separation of Chessman from his papers was shown 
to have been an incident of punishment for his violation of a 
reasonable prison rule against the creation of loud disturb-
ances. The refusal to permit him to see Mr. Garry was 
shown to have been based on the reasonable ground that Mr. 
Garry was not his attorney. [8] It is manifest from the 
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record of this habeas corpus 
man is not but 
court which tried him and this court 
occasion to point out, Chessman's decision to represent him-
self did not entitle him to greater than other 
prisoners. (See People v. Chessman (1951), supra, 38 Cal.2d 
166, 173-174, 176.) 
[9] When it developed at the hearings that Chessman 
was not then being of rights to which he as a 
prisoner was entitled, the superior court should have 
the People's motion to dismiss. Instead it made an order 
which purports to declare that Chessman ''continue to be 
allowed'' privileges which are not enforceable rights of pris-
oners. [10] :B~or example, it would be manifestly impossible 
to allow prisoners ''immediate access by mail to the courts 
... at all times." [11] As indicated above, prisoners 
have the right to prompt and timely access to the mails for 
the purpose of transmitting to the courts statements of facts 
whieh attempt to show any ground for relief, but they have 
no legally enforeeable rights to engage in legal research. 2 
Sinee it has not been shown that Chessman was being deprived 
of any rights at the time of the making of the superior court 
order, and since that order purports to declare that he is to 
be allowed future privileges to which he is not entitled, the 
order cannot be upheld. 
For the reasons above stated, the motions of Chessman are 
denied; the writ of review is discharged and the review pro-
ceeding is dismissed; the order on habeas corpus is reversed 
and the cause on habeas corpus is remanded to the superior 
court with directions that the writ be discharged, the peti-
tioner be remanded to the custody of the warden, and the 
proceeding be dismissed. Let the remittiturs issue forthwith. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, ,J., concurred. 
Edmonds, J., and 'rraynor, J., eoncurred in the judgment. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
I see no occasion for reading words into section 1506 of 
the Penal Code which makes appealable only an order of the 
"''A person sentenced to death is deemed civilly dead during the 
existence of the death sentence.'' (Pen. Code, § 2602.) Also, because 
Chessman is under sentence to life imprisonment he is deemed civilly 
dead (Pen. Code, § 2601) and because he is under sentence to imprison· 
ment for terms less than life his civil rights are suspended (Pen. Code, 
§ 2600). 
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court which discharges petitioner from custody. It 
has been held repeatedly that in only those situations expressly 
covered by section 1506 was an order in habeas corpus pro-
cccuu•"'" appealable becanse the rule prior to its enactment 
had been that the state could not appeal. (In re Alpine, 
203 CaL 731 P. 947, 58 A.L.R. 1500]; In re Bruegger, 
204 Cal. 169 [267 P. 101] ; Thuesen v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. 
572 [12 P.2d ; Loustalot v. Superior Court, 30 Cal.2d 905 
[186 P.2d 673); In re Merwin, 108 Cal.App. 31 [290 P. 1076]; 
In re Dutton, 119 Cal.App. 447 [6 P.2d 558] .) The Bruegger 
case states the reason for the rule: ''The primary purpose 
of the writ of habeas corpus is to provide a summary and 
speedy mode of inquiring into the legality of imprisonment 
or restraint . . . the writ would be deprived of its effect if 
an order made pursuant to the inquiry can be suspended, and 
the person or parties affected can be compelled to undergo 
the delay attendant upon an appeal to the higher court.'' 
(Emphasis added; In re Bntegger, supra, 204 Cal. 169, 171.) 
The use of the word "discharge" in section 1506 is plain 
enough. It can mean only one thing, release from custody. 
If there is any doubt as to its meaning it is completely dis-
pelled by the remainder of the section which states that in 
case of s1wh appeal defendant shall not be discharged from 
custody where the judgment of conviction has become final 
pending the appeal; however, defendant may be admitted to 
bail pending the appeal. If ''discharge'' is not limited to a 
release from custody these provisions in the section become 
meaningless. 
Aside from the question of appealability I cannot agree with 
the majority opinion on the merits. While it is difficult to 
ascertain precisely what the holding is, the result is a com-
reversal of the judgment. That reversal seems to be 
prrdicated upon the ground that because petitioner was given 
the facilities to which the order said he was entitled the 
q nestion has become moot. In reaching that conclusion the 
majority ignores the fact that the evidence supports the order 
of the superior court in that the conduct of the prison 
authorities was such that it could at least be inferred that they 
would continue to withhold the facilities from petitioner un-
less a court ordered otherwise. It is similar to a case in which 
an injunction is sought, and there is a showing of threatened 
injury by defendant, but after the injunction is ordered he 
says he will be a "good boy." His belated repentance fur-
nishes no basis for reversing the judgment granting the 
12 IN RE CrncSS:\IAN [44 C.2d 
injunction. 'l'he to decide the 
question anew in spite of its on appeal by the 
conclusion of the trial court on evidence. 
The evidence shows that the authorities delayed for 
14 days in permitting petitioner to have ace.ess to the courts; 
that despite the advice of the attorney petitioner was 
deprived of such access; that was deprived of his 
personal books and papers and from working on his 
case; indeed, this is admitted the warden and he insisted 
on his right to do so; that the warden refused to permit peti-
tioner to consult with an whom petitioner had re-
quested to call at the prison and consult with him and the 
warden testified that if petitioner asked to see that attorney 
again, "I am not prepared to say whether or not we would 
approve it.'' All of these things justified the superior court 
in concluding that there existed a real danger that the prison 
authorities would continue to deny the rights to which peti-
tioner was entitled. It is of little significance that at the time 
of the hearing petitioner was not being deprived of his rights. 
That constituted nothing more than a conflict in the evidence 
on the question of what the warden's future conduct would be. 
Or it might be vievved as a confession that they had been 
wrong in their action and, in effect, a stipulation that the 
order made by the trial court should be made. Judicial pro-
tection of the rights of a prisoner would indeed be a mockery 
if the courts would always accept the pious protestations of 
the prison authorities that the rights would be accorded and 
then blithely disregard them the next day, leaving the prisoner 
to commence again his weary journey through the court 
process toward a chimerical goal. Such conditions are intoler-
able in a civilized society, yet this court now espouses them. 
In mandamus proceedings it has been held that the writ 
is proper where the conduct of the officers indicates they do 
not intend to perform their duty. In Imperial Mut. L. Ins. Co. 
v. Caminetti, 59 Cal..App.2d 494, 497 [139 P.2d 693], the 
court said: "[T]he general rule is that the act sought to be 
compelled by mandamus must be one to the performance of 
which the party is entitled at the time the proceeding in 
mandate is instituted ... but that rule is subject to a 
kindred rule that mandate may be resorted to when it appears 
from the conduct or declarations of the officer or board, that 
they do not intend to comply with their obligation ... when 
the time for such action arrives. . . . To insist in an equitable 
proceeding such as mandate is, and under the facts and cir-
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cumstances here that should have been 
compelled to file a for renewal of its license for the 
few days between June 15th and June 30th, 1941, and then, 
subsequent to July file another petition for the ensuing 
fiscal year ending J nne 30, 1942, would do violence to the rule 
enunciated in section 3532 of the Civil Code, which reads 'The 
law neither docs nor idle acts.' Equity will also 
consider the fact that there is no showing of prejudice to 
appellant commissioner reason of the time when the action 
herein was filed .... Equity does not look with favor upon 
litigation by piece-meal, and whenever possible will dispose 
of the entire controversy between the parties, will grant com-
plete relief and whenever possible will settle and determine 
all differences between the parties in the one action, leaving 
nothing for further litigation between the same parties and 
upon the same subject-matter.'' 
·with reference to injunctions the rule has been stated to 
be : "However, the mere cessation by defendant of the alleged 
acts or conduct, before or after the beginning of a suit for 
injunction, has been held not a bar to the issuance of an 
injunction, and in a proper case, as where there is a reasonable 
ground to believe that there will be a resumption of such 
activities, a court of equity may issue an injunction." ( 43 
C.J.S., Injunctions,§ 22(d); see also Boggs v. North American 
Bond etc. Co., 6 Cal.2d 523 [58 P.2d 918].) 
The rights assured to petitioner by the order of the superior 
court are important and any impairment thereof must be 
c·arefully scrutinized. It is said in Ex parte H7tll, 312 U.S. 
546, 549 [61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ecl. 1034]: "[T]he state and its 
officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply 
to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. vVhether a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court 
is properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are 
questiolls for that court alone to determine.'' The court said 
in In t'e R1'der., 50 Cal.App. 797, 799 [195 P. 965]: "The right 
of an accused, confined in jail or other place of detention 
... to have an opportunity to consult freely with his counsel 
·without any third person, ·whose presence is objectionable 
to the accused, being present to hear what passes between 
the accused and his counsel, is one of the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by the Amerie:m criminal law-a right that no 
legislature or court can ignore or violate. In this state, the 
right of an accused to consult with his counsel is guaranteed 
by the constitution, which, in section 13 of article I, expressly 
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declares that 'in criminal what-
ever, the party accused shall have the . appear 
and in person and with counsel.' rrhis clause of the 
constitution unquestionably was to secure to the 
accused person all the benefits which may fimv from thP 
employment of counsd to conduct his defense. To afford him 
those benefits it is essential that he should allowed to 
consult with his not only the actual 
but prior in order to prepare for his defense. The 
privilege of the presence of counsel upon the trial would be 
poor concession if the right of consultation with such 
counsel prior to the trial were denied. It is essential 
to the enjoyment of this constitutional that the 
accused should have the right to a consultation with 
his counsel. As said by the Oklahoma criminal court of ap-
peals, 'It would be a cheap subterfuge of and a senseless 
mockery upon justice for the state to put a man on trial 
in its courts, charged with an offense which involved his life, 
liberty, or character, and then place him in such a position 
that he could not prepare to make his defense. It would be 
just as reasonable to place shackles upon a man's limbs, and 
then tell him that it is his right and duty to defend himself 
against an impending physical assault. If the right of defense 
exists, it includes and carries \Yith it the right of such freedom 
of action as is essential and necessary to make such defense 
complete. In fact, there can be no such thing as a legal 
trial, unless both parties are allowed a reasonable opportunity 
to prepare to vindicate their rights .... It therefore neces-
C'arily follows that it is the absolute right of charged 
with crime to confer privately with their attorneys, and that 
it is an illegal abridgment of this right for a sheriff, jailer, 
or other officer to deny to a defendant the right to commit 
his attorneys except in the presence of such officer .... It 
is the duty of officers having the custody of persons charged 
with crime to afford them a reasonable opportunity to pri-
vately consult with their attorneys, without having other 
persons present, taking such precautions as may be necessary, 
according to the circumstances of each case, to prevent the 
escape of such prisoner.'" (See also In re Robinson, 112 Cal. 
App.2d 626 [246 P.2c1 982].) There is no basis whatsoever 
for the statement in the majority opinion that petitioner is 
seeking or sought or was granted ''special privileges.'' 'l'he 
rights sought by petitioner and granted by the trial court are 
the rights which must be accorded to all prisoners if the 
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of " ual under law" is to have any signifi-
whatever. 
The states that prisoners have a right to prompt 
and access the mails "for the purpose of transmit-
to the courts'' facts which show ground for relief but 
"have no legal1.v cnforrcAblr rights to engAgr in legal 
research.'' :B~or that conclusion it cites the code sections to 
is dead. What bearing that 
on a to defend himself dors not appear. 
If he may transmit "facts" to the courts in an attempt to 
obtain r01 ief he should also be entitled to transmit legal 
To do either reqnires reasonable opportunity 
to prepare the faets and the law. If that requires legal 
rrseareh then a reasonable opportunity therrfor should be 
The order of the trial eourt here did not go bryond 
the bounds of reason. Certainly it cannot be said its order 
is so unreasonable that it abused its discretion. 
The majority deeision here is another, in a long line of 
decisions by this court, in whieh this petitioner has been 
denied his constitutional rights. (See People v. Chessman, 
:56 Cal.2d 455 [218 P.2d 769, 19 A.hR.2d 1084]; People v. 
Chessman. 38 Cal.2d 166 [238 P.2d 1001] ; In re Chessman, 
4;l Ca1.2d 408 [274 P.2d 645] .) 
I wonld affirm the order here under review. 
The application of respondent on appeal in Grim. No. 559] 
Heal I'Rrty in l ntercst in S. F. No. 19158 for a rehearing 
\Yas denied Mareh :3, lf)i).). Carter. ,J.. and Traynor, .T., wen' 
of the opinion that the applieation should be granted. 
